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STEPPING FORWARD OR STUMBLING BACK? 
COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY FOR FAILURE 
TO ACT, CIVILIAN SUPERIORS AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
The application of the doctrine of command responsibility (“CR”) to civilian 
leaders is unsettled under international law. Jurisprudence which has applied 
CR to civilian leaders has been inconsistent, unprincipled and potentially 
unjust. International decisions such as the Celebici case at the ICTY suggest 
that CR can theoretically apply to civilians, but the subsequent Kordic decision 
indicates that international jurists are extremely wary of extending CR to 
civilian leaders. The Rome Statute of the nascent International Criminal Court 
is the first codified international law that explicitly provides for individual 
criminal liability for civilians on the basis of CR. This paper argues that, given 
the unsettled status of civilian CR under customary international law, the 
Rome Statute is an improvement for the mere fact that it explicitly provides CR 
for civilians. As such, criticisms that the ICC provisions weaken the doctrine 
in relation to civilian leaders are incorrect because they misconstrue the status 
quo under international custom. It is not settled under international law 
whether and to what extent command responsibility even applies to civilians. 
Moreover, in the few cases in which command responsibility has been used to 
hold civilians responsible for international crimes, the doctrine has resulted in 
injustice. As such, the explicit codification of the doctrine in relation to civilians 
is an improvement on, rather than a regression of, the status quo of CR.
DANIEL WATT†
 † Daniel Watt will complete the requirements for an LL.B. from Dalhousie University in 
2008, and will be articling at McInnes Cooper in Halifax, Nova Scotia.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The international law doctrine of command responsibility (“CR”) has generated 
controversy since at least 1946, when Japanese General Yamashita was executed 
for war crimes committed in the Philippines by soldiers under his command.1 
Traditionally, CR imposes individual liability on military commanders for 
failure to prevent or punish unlawful acts committed by subordinates.2 In 
the decades between 1946 and the early 1990s, CR essentially arose only with 
regard to the 1968 massacre of civilians by U.S. soldiers in My Lai, Vietnam, 
and the pogroms by Phalangist militia in Israeli-controlled refugee camps in 
Lebanon in 1982.3, With the creation of the International Criminal Tribunals 
for Rwanda (“ICTR”) and the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) in the 1990s, CR 
gained new importance. The doctrine is no less relevant today. Questions of 
individual liability for violations of international humanitarian law (“IHL”)4 
are bound to arise as states struggle to redefine that body of law in the novel 
and complex context of international terrorism. With the legal rules in a state 
of in flux, torture and other violations of IHL appear to be becoming all too 
common occurrences in the global war on terror.5
The application of CR to military commanders is generally settled at 
international law. Much more controversial is the application of CR to non-
military superiors, such as civilian political leaders. International decisions 
on this issue are sparse, and often questionable in their reasoning. There 
1  Major William H. Parks, “Command Responsibility for War Crimes” (1973) 62 Mil. L. 
Rev. 1 at 2, 22-23 [Parks]; see also In re Yamashita (1945) 1 327 U.S. 1 [Yamashita]. 
2  Ibid.
3  Weston Burnett, “Command Responsibility and a Case Study of the Criminal 
Responsibility of Israeli Military Commanders for the Pogrom at Shatila and Sabra” (1985) 
107 Mil. L. Rev. 71 at 72-76; William Fenrick, “Some International Law Problems Related 
to Prosecutions before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia” 
(1995-1996) 6 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l. L. 103, at 118, 120 [Fenrick, “ICTY Problems”].
4  This term refers to the body of law which governs situations of armed conflict, 
sometimes called the laws of war or law of armed conflict. 
5  See generally Jordan Paust, “Executive Plans and Authorizations to Violate International 
Law Concerning Treatment and Interrogation of Detainees” (2004-2005) 43 Colum. J. 
Transnat’l L. 811. 
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has also been scant comment by international legal scholars. As such, the 
question of whether and how CR applies to civilian superiors is unclear. 
Yet, CR offers a potentially powerful basis for holding civilian superiors to 
account for violations of IHL. Rwandan Prime Minister Jean Kambanda’s 
conviction at the ICTR illustrates that war criminals often wear business 
suits rather than military fatigues.6 
Given the unsettled status quo, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (“ICC”)7, which codifies distinct CR provisions for military commanders 
and civilian superiors in its Article 28, is an improvement on the existing 
customary international law of CR. There has been little academic discussion 
of Article 28. The most detailed analysis of Article 28, by commentator Greg 
Vetter, criticises the provision for “weaken[ing] the reach of the doctrine 
for civilian superiors” by holding civilians to a lower standard in relation to 
military commanders.8 Relying on the “contemporary authority”9 on CR, 
the Celebici decision of the ICTY,10 Vetter argues that the ICC’s “bifurcated” 
approach regresses from past IHL jurisprudence, which has on occasion 
convicted civilian superiors on the basis of command responsibility.11 
This paper is a response to Vetter’s criticisms.12 It will show that Vetter’s 
critique is well-intentioned, but are based on a misreading of customary 
6  Prosecutor v. Kambanda (1998), ICTR-97-23-S (International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, Trial Chamber) (Kambanda was convicted on a guilty plea, and sentenced to 
life imprisonment; he appealed, essentially trying to withdraw the plea. His claim was 
dismissed: Kambanda v. Prosecutor (2000), ICTR-97-23-A (ICTR, Appeal Chamber)).
7  17 July 1998, Can. T.S. 2002 No.13, art.28 (entered into force in Canada 1 July 2002) 
[Rome Statute].
8  Greg Vetter, “Command Responsibility of Non-Military Superiors in the International 
Criminal Court (ICC)” (2000) 25 Yale J. Int’l. L. J. 89 at 93-94, 126, 141[Vetter]. 
9  Alexander Zahar, “Command Responsibility of Civilian Superiors for Genocide” (2001) 
14 Leiden. J. Int’l. L. 591 at 592 [Zahar].
10  Prosecutor v. Delalic et al. (1996) Case No. IT-96-21-T (ICTY, Trial Chamber) [Celebici].
11  Vetter, supra note 8 at 95. 
12  There is very little academic discussion specifically addressing the issue of CR for 
civilians in the context of the Article 28 of the Rome Statute. While some commentators 
and jurisprudence rely on the post-WWII and ICTY/ICTR jurisprudence to assert that 
customary CR applies to civilians (see generally Lippmann, infra; Celebici, supra). Vetter 
explicitly uses such reasoning to critique the ICC provisions as a regression from the 
customary state of the law. Responding to Vetter’s criticism is thus important, as a codified 
CR provision for civilians is a new—and in this author’s opinion—welcome development.
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international law. Celebici certainly suggests that CR can be applied to civilian 
superiors. Vetter, however, is overly optimistic about the scope of Celebici. 
In the light of the later Kordic decision,13 it is doubtful whether courts will 
ever actually apply Celebici to hold civilian superiors to account. Vetter’s 
criticisms of the Rome Statute rely blithely on questionable and inconsistent 
precedents from the post-World War II Tokyo Trial14 and the ICTR.15 Given 
the unsatisfactory and unsettled state of CR at customary international law, 
this paper argues that Article 28 of the Rome Statute is not a regression. 
Rather, it codifies a clear standard in an area of IHL that has historically 
been applied inconsistently and possibly, unjustly. 
In Part II CR will be described and distinguished from related concepts, 
which also provides an outline of the fundamental rationale and theoretical 
justification for the doctrine. After briefly distinguishing between two main 
sources of IHL, several specific legal sources of CR are outlined. Part III 
concludes with an examination of the contested CR provisions of the Rome 
Statute. In Part IV the main argument is drawn out, showing that certain 
examples of past international decisions applying CR to civilians are poorly 
reasoned, do not accord with the doctrine’s fundamental justifications, and 
weaken the practical effect of Celebici. 
13  Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez (2001), Case No. IT-95-14/2-T (ICTY, Trial Chamber) 
[Kordic].
14  Matthew Lippman, “Humanitarian Law: The Uncertain Contours of Command 
Responsibility” (2001) 8 Tul. J. Comp. & Int’l. L. 1 at 22-24 [Lippman]. 
15  Prosecutor v. Musema (2000), Case No. ICTR-96-13-T (ICTR, Trial Chamber I) 
[Musema]; Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana (1999), Case No. ICTR-95-1-T (ICTR, 
Trial Chamber II); see also Zahar, supra note 9 at 592.
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II. DEFINING THE DOCTRINE
A. Command Responsibility for Failure to Act
There are two related and overlapping forms of CR which should be 
distinguished. The first is “direct” CR, whereby criminal liability arises when 
a commander orders his or her subordinates to commit unlawful acts.16 
Direct CR is a separate mode of liability for what could broadly be termed 
‘direct participation’ in the offence, which includes ‘ordering’ and ‘planning’ 
offences. Article 7(1) of the ICTY’s constating statute (“ICTY Statute”), for 
instance, provides for direct CR as follows:17
A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or 
otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation 
or execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the 
present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the 
crime.
Article 6 of the ICTR’s statute (“ICTR Statute”)18 mirrors article 7(1) of the 
ICTY Statute. The Rome Statute similarly provides for direct CR in article 
25(3)(b), which imposes individual CR where the accused person “orders, 
solicits or induces the commission of such a crime”.19
However, the debate surrounding the Rome Statute hinges on “indirect” CR, 
or CR “stricto sensu”.20 This form of the doctrine, which is the focus of this 
16  Celebici, supra note 10 ¶ 333. 
17  Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former 
Yugoslavia Since 1991, SC Res. 827, UN SCOR, 1993, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993) [ICTY 
Statute].
18  Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible 
for Genocide and other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed 
in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such 
Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States, Between 1 January 1994 
and 31 December 1994, SC Res. 955, UN SCOR, 1994, UN Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) [ICTR 
Statute]. 
19  Rome Statute, supra note 7 art. 25(3)(b). 
20  Celebici, supra note 10 ¶ 333-334.
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paper, is termed more precisely as “command responsibility for failure to 
act.”21 As Bill Fenrick points out, it is this more controversial variety with 
which IHL specialists have been primarily concerned.22 In this form, CR 
imposes criminal liability on superiors for failing to prevent or punish the 
international crimes of subordinates. As I discuss further in Part III, indirect 
CR is provided for by article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute,23 article 6(3) of the 
ICTR Statute24 and article 28 of the Rome Statute.25 
B. The Rationale for Command Responsibility 
CR for failure to act is a mode of liability whereby, under certain conditions, 
individual criminal liability will be imputed to a superior for unlawful 
acts committed by his or her subordinates.26 Traditionally, CR has applied 
primarily to military commanders.27 The doctrine is designed to deter the 
unchecked violence which can so quickly erupt during armed conflict. 
Under the threat of individual criminal liability, commanders have incentive 
to keep a tight rein on the conduct of subordinates. As Matthew Lippman 
notes: 28
The imposition of criminal culpability is intended to 
create an incentive to insure that subordinates abide by 
the humanitarian law of war. This extension of liability is 
necessitated by the lethal consequences resulting from the 
contravention of the code of conflict.
 
21  This is a term used by Bill Fenrick in his course in International Humanitarian Law at 
Dalhousie University (2007); see generally Celebici, supra note 10 ¶ 338; William Fenrick, 
“Some International Law Problems Related to Prosecutions before the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia” (1995-1996) 6 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l. L. 103, 
at 110 [Fenrick, “ICTY Problems”]. 
22  Fenrick “ICTY Problems”, supra note 3 at 110.
23  ICTY Statute, supra note 17 art. 7(3). 
24  ICTR Statute, supra note 18 art. 6(3). 
25  Rome Statute, supra note 7 art. 28. 
26  Parks, supra note 1 at 20; Celebici, supra note 10 ¶ 333-334; Lippman, supra note 14 at 1. 
27  See Parks supra note 1; Fenrick “ICTY Problems”, supra note 3 at 110; Burnett, supra 
note 3 at 76. 
28  Lippmann, supra note 14 at 1. 
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In addition to its deterrent value, CR imposes an additional mode of 
liability, beyond direct participation, on those responsible for violations 
of IHL. As Vetter suggests, “the doctrine of command responsibility 
has been an important tool to hold accountable leaders who plan, 
participate in, or acquiesce in large-scale human rights abuses.”29 The 
practical effect for prosecutors, and accused superiors in the dock, is 
that CR provides an alternative argument for liability; in the event the 
accused is acquitted of ordering a breach of IHL, the accused may still 
be held liable for failing to prevent or punish the breach.30 The ICTY 
indictment of Tihomir Blaskic illustrates the additional prosecutorial 
scope provided by CR:31
From May 1992 to January 1994 Tihomir BLASKIC, 
together with members of the HVO, planned, instigated, 
ordered, or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, 
preparation, or execution of a crime against humanity by 
persecuting Bosnian Muslim civilians on political, racial, 
or religious grounds […] 
and, or in the alternative, knew or had reason to know that 
subordinates were about to do the same, or had done so, 
and failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to 
prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.
CR, therefore, provides both deterrent and procedural benefits. It deters 
violations by threatening punishment for failure to control subordinates. 
It also expands the basis on which superiors can be held liable. As such, 
CR is useful for preventing deterring war crimes and punishing those who 
orchestrate them.
Nevertheless, the other side of the coin is – or should be – concerned with 
fairness and rights of the accused. CR has great potential for delivering 
29  Vetter, supra note 8, at 92.
30  William J. Fenrick, The Prosecution of Unlawful Attack Cases before the ICTY (2004) 7 
Y.B. Int’l. Human. L. 153, at 177-178 [Fenrick, “ICTY Prosecution].
31  Prosecutor v. Blaskic (2000), Case No. IT-95-14 (ICTY, Trial Chamber I) (Second 
Amended Indictment).
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justice. Yet, as will be shown, if improperly applied, it has commensurate 
potential for injustice. 
C. Basis for Liability under CR 
CR imposes criminal liability on commanders for crimes which they did not 
directly commit. By punishing one person for the acts of another, CR can 
be fraught with moral and legal pitfalls. The underlying justification for the 
“potential harshness” of the doctrine is the recognition of the commander’s 
legal “duty to control the conduct of his subordinates, insuring their 
compliance with the law of war.”32 As Celebici holds:33 
[CR] is best understood when seen against the principle 
that criminal responsibility for omissions is incurred only 
where there exists a legal obligation to act… [I]nternational 
law imposes an affirmative duty on superiors to prevent 
persons under their control from committing violations 
of [IHL], and it is ultimately this duty that provides the 
basis for, and defines the contours of, the imputed criminal 
responsibility…
The imposition of criminal liability on a commander for failure to prevent or 
punish crimes committed by subordinates thus requires that the commander 
was under a positive duty to do so. This principle is “reasonable and fair,” 
and in accordance with general principles of criminal justice.34 If civilian 
superiors are to be held accountable on the basis of CR, they must also be 
under such a duty. 
The duty imposed on military commanders does not arise simply because 
they don a uniform. It cannot be the case that every superior becomes 
criminally liable for the unlawful acts of every rank and file soldier. Rather, 
the duty arises because of the “control” a commander exerts over the conduct 
32  Parks, supra note 1 at 20, 35.
33  Celebici, supra note 10 ¶ 334. 
34  Arthur Thomas O`Reilly, “Command Responsibility: A Call to Realign Doctrine with 
Principles” (2004-2005) 20 Am. U. Int’l. L. Rev. 71 at 98. 
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of subordinates.35 Lippman notes that CR presumes that “military officers 
and civilian officials possess the knowledge, authority and power to curb the 
transgressions of their troops.”36 Presaging Celebici, Lieutenant Commander 
Burnett puts it best, stating that CR “hinges to a great extent, on the degree 
of effective control actually wielded by the commander over the detailed 
activities of his subordinates.”37 In the absence of actual control, therefore, 
the basis for imposing the legal duty breaks down. 
CR is traditionally a military doctrine, with roots going back millennia.38 
The archetypical strict military command structure suggests that soldiers 
obediently carry out superior orders without question or hesitation. Where 
subordinates commit atrocities, one presumes that either they were ordered 
to do so, or that their superior has lost control over their conduct. The same 
presumption of control, however, does not arise as readily with respect 
to civilian superiors. Indeed, given the less centralised nature of modern 
military command structures, control can no longer be safely presumed 
even in the case of military commanders.39 This highlights the key issue of 
whether the legal duty to control subordinates can properly be imposed on 
civilian leaders. The question is, under what circumstances, and to what 
extent, can civilian leaders be expected to control those “on the ground” 
who directly violate IHL? Jurisprudence on this issue, as I show below, does 
not answer this issue satisfactorily. 
35  Parks, supra note 1 at 35, 63, 65.
36  Lippman, supra note 14 at 90. 
37  Burnett, supra note 3 at 76. 
38  Parks, supra note 1, at 3.
39  Burnett, supra note 3 at 76. 
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III. OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL  
SOURCES OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY
A. Sources of IHL
IHL, like all international law, arises from two main sources: conventional 
international law, such as treaties and conventions; and customary international 
law.40 Customary international law arises from state practice, and requires that 
there is “a consistent and general international practice among states, and [that] the 
practice [is] accepted as law by the international community.41 This latter element 
is termed opinio juris.42 The significance of customary law is that it is binding on 
all states, unless a particular state has “consistently and unequivocally [refused] 
to accept a custom in the process of formation.”43 Conventional international law, 
by contrast, binds only those states which have signed and ratified a particular 
agreement.44 However, conventional law can pass into customary international 
law.45 For example, Roberts and Guelff suggest that the Geneva Conventions46 
and the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land47 have over time emerged as customary international law.48
40  See Statute of the International Court of Justice, 26 June 1945, Can. T.S. 1945 No. 7, art. 
38 (entered into force in Canada 24 October 1945), cited in Hugh M. Kindred et al., eds., 
International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied in Canada , 7th ed. (Toronto: Emonds 
Montgomery Publications, 2006), at 107. 
41  Kindred et al., ibid. at 148. 
42  Ibid.. 
43  Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff, eds., Documents of the Laws of War, 3rd ed. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003) at 7. 
44  Kindred et al., supra note 40 at 113. 
45  Roberts & Guelff, supra note 43 at 7-8. 
46  Geneva Convention I for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and 
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field [Geneva Convention I]; Geneva Convention II for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces 
at Sea [Geneva Convention II]; Geneva Convention II Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners 
of War [Geneva Convention III]; Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Treatment of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War [Geneva Convention IV]. All the aforementioned signed 
12 August 1949, Can. T.S. 1965 No. 20 (entered into force 21 October 1950, entered into 
force in Canada 14 May 1965).
47  18 October 1907, [treaty series] (entered into force 26 January 1910) [Hague Convention 
IV], cited in Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman, eds., The Laws of Armed Conflict (Leiden & 
Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004) at 55-87.
48  Roberts & Guelff, supra note 43 at 8. 
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B. Early International Instruments: Hague Convention IV
In 1907, the Hague Convention IV and its Hague Regulations49 became the 
first international instrument to codify a form of CR.50 The Hague Convention 
IV allowed for state liability rather than individual criminal liability.51 The 
Hague Regulations require that, in order to qualify as a lawful belligerent, 
the party’s armed force must be “commanded by a person responsible for 
his subordinates.”52 In the context of the development of CR, the Hague 
Convention IV “is a manifestation and codification of that which was custom 
among the signatory nations, giving early recognition to the duties and 
responsibilities of the commander.”53 
The Hague Convention IV therefore codified the general notion that 
commanders are responsible for their subordinates. It did not, however, 
impose individual criminal liability on commanders for breaches of the laws 
of war committed by their subordinates. Such liability did not arise until 
after the Second World War. 
C. The Second World War Trials and CR as Custom
The aftermath of the Second World War established a number of crucial 
precedents with respect to CR. It is partly this foundation upon which 
Vetter relies to assert that Article 28 is a regression from the scope of CR as 
it exists as customary international law. This section attempts to show that 
the customary foundation for CR does not go so far as Vetter suggests. The 
impact of the Yamashita decision, two key Nuremberg decisions and the 
Tokyo Trials are briefly summarised here. 
The customary international law foundation for CR was the 1945 prosecution 
of General Yamashita, commander of Japanese forces in the Philippines, and 
military governor of the Philippines, before an American military commission 
49  Annex to the Convention (IV): Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land, 18 October 1907, [Treaty Series] [Hague Regulations]. 
50  Parks, supra note 1 at 10-11; L.C. Green, “Command Responsibility in International 
Humanitarian Law” (1995) 5 Transnat’l. L. & Contemp. Probs. 319 at 325 [Green, “CR”]] 
51  Hague Convention IV, supra note 46 art. 3. 
52  Parks, supra note 1 at 10-11, citing Hague Regulations, art. 1. 
53  Ibid, at 11. 
Civilian Command Responsibility152 2008
consisting of lay members.54 Yamashita was convicted of war crimes committed 
by his troops.55 Yamashita’s significance with respect to CR stems from his 
petition for habeas corpus to the United States Supreme Court.56 In dismissing 
the petition, the Court held that international law imposed “an affirmative 
duty to take such measures as were within his power and appropriate in the 
circumstances to protect prisoners of war and the civilian population.”57
Some have mistakenly interpreted Yamashita as imposing a “strict liability” 
standard, whereby knowledge of subordinates’ crimes is presumed from 
a position of command and widespread occurrence of crimes.58 This 
interpretation has been firmly rejected by subsequent jurisprudence and 
commentary.59 What it did establish was that CR imposed individual criminal 
liability on military commanders for failure to control their subordinates. 
Yamashita thus provided a basis for subsequent international trials. 
The Nuremberg Trial was created in 1945.60 The most important CR 
precedents are the High Command 61 and Hostages62 cases.63 High Command 
involved 14 high-ranking German officers.64 Most of the charges related to 
illegal conduct committed by soldiers and the issuance and transmission of 
illegal orders.65 The decision defined the parameters of the commanders’ duty 
54  Ibid, note 1 at 37; Burnett, supra note 3 at 87. 
55  Parks, ibid. at 22, 37, 64.
56  Yamashita, supra note 1.
57  Ibid.
58  Vetter, supra note 8 at 107-108; Lippman, supra note 14 at 14. 
59  Burnett, supra note 3 at 92-94, 98; Parks, supra note 1 at 31; Celebici, supra note 10 ¶ 
384-386; William Hays Parks, “A Few Tools in the Prosecution of War Crimes” (1995) 149 
Mil. L. Rev. 73, at 74 [Parks, “A Few Tools”]. 
60  Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the 
European Axis, 8 August 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 280 (entered into force 8 August 1945) [London 
Agreement].
61  U.S. v. Wilhelm von Leeb et al., UN War Crimes Commission, 12 Law Reports of Trials of 
War Criminals 23 (1948) [High Command], cited in Burnett, supra note 3 at 88, note 114.
62  U.S. v. Wilhelm List et al., UN War Crimes Commission, 8 Law Reports of Trials of War 
Criminals 34 (1948) [Hostages], cited in Burnett, supra note 3 at 99, note 113. 
63  Parks, supra note 1; Burnett, supra note 3; Lippman, supra note 14; Green, “CR”, supra 
note 53.
64  Burnett, supra note 3 at 88. 
65  Ibid, at 99. 
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confirmed in Yamashita.66 The “standard of responsibility” was interpreted 
as “a breach of some moral obligation, fixed by international law, a personal 
act voluntarily done with knowledge of its inherent criminality under 
international law.”67 Any strict liability theory was rejected.68 Participation 
or even “acquiescence” in the transmission of illegal orders would attract 
liability.69 Superior orders were rejected as a defence, but might mitigate 
punishment.70 Liability required more than the mere existence of a superior-
subordinate relationship.71 Instead, crimes must be “directly traceable” to 
the commander, or the failure to supervise subordinates must constitute 
“criminal negligence.”72 The threshold was “a wanton, immoral disregard 
of the action of his subordinates amounting to acquiescence.”73 Any other 
standard “would go far beyond the basic principles of criminal law as known 
to civilized nations.”74
Hostages involved 12 generals accused of war crimes committed in countries 
occupied by Germany.75 The accused were charged for “the murder and 
deportation of thousands of persons” on their orders.76 The main CR issue 
was whether commanders could be liable for troops over which they do not 
exercise operational control.77 Hostages distinguished between commanders 
with tactical control, and those charged with administering an occupied 
territory. Those exercising “tactical command” were responsible only for 
the acts of troops over which they had operational control.78 Commanders 
in control of an occupied area, however, had a broader responsibility.79 The 
Tribunal imposed more expansive CR on such commanders based on the 
66  Parks, supra note 1 at 63. 
67  Ibid. at 40, citing High Command. 
68  Ibid. 
69  Ibid. at 41-42. 
70  Ibid. at 42. 
71  Ibid. at 43. 
72  Ibid. 
73  Ibid.
74  Ibid. 
75  Burnett, supra note 3 at 109. 
76  Parks, supra note 1 at 58. 
77  Ibid. at 60. 
78  Burnett, supra note 3, at 110. 
79  Burnett, supra note 3, at 110. 
Civilian Command Responsibility154 2008
international legal obligation of those charged with administering occupied 
territory.80 
The International Military Tribunal for the Far East (“Tokyo Trial”) was 
established in 1946.81 28 Japanese officers and civilian Cabinet ministers were 
charged with international crimes spanning decades,82 including the 1937 
Rape of Nanking.83 The charges alleged on the basis of CR dealt mainly with 
“the mistreatment and security of prisoners of war.”84 The Tokyo Trial’s main 
significance with regard to CR is two-fold. First, the Tribunal held civilian 
political leaders liable on the basis of CR. This issue will be dealt with further 
below. This section addresses the second main significance, its discussion of 
CR for military commanders. 
The Tribunal found that customary law imposed a duty to prevent 
mistreatment of prisoners of war and civilian internees.85 This duty was 
imposed on the responsible government members and military officers.86 
Superiors had to prevent mistreatment by “establishing and securing a 
continuous and efficient working system.”87 If this duty was met, but war 
crimes were nevertheless committed, superiors could be held responsible on 
two bases. First, they would be liable if they knew of the crimes and “failed 
to take such steps as were within their power to prevent the commission of 
80  See Leslie Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict, 2nd ed. (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2000), at 303, note 110 [Green, “LOAC”]; Parks, supra note 1 
at 256-267; Burnett, supra note 3 at 112.  
81  General Douglas MacArthur, United States Army, General Orders No. 1, Special 
Proclamation: Establishment of an International Military Tribunal for the Far East (signed 
in Tokyo, 19 January 1946), as am’d by General Order No. 20;Charter of the International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East (signed in Tokyo, 19 January 1946) [Tokyo Trial 
Charter], reprinted in R. John Pritchard & Sonia Magbanua Zaide, eds., The Tokyo War 
Crimes Trial, v. 1 (New York & London: Garland Publishing Inc.,1981).
82  See Pritchard & Zaide, ibid, “Indictment”, Group One, Count 1.
83  Parks, supra note 1 at 68. 
84  Lippman, supra note 14 at 17; Pritchard & Zaide, supra note 85, at “Indictment”, Group 
Three, Counts 53-55; Burnett, supra note 3 at 115.
85  Volume 200, Official Transcript of the International Japanese War Crimes Trials in the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East, at 48 442 to 48 447 [Transcript].
86  Ibid.
87  Ibid. 
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such crimes in the future.”88 Second, criminal negligence would arise if they 
“failed to acquire such knowledge.”89
In sum, the post-World War II decisions recognised that, as a matter 
of customary international law, a commander has “a duty to supervise 
and control the conduct of his subordinates in accordance with existing 
principles of the law of war.”90 The distinctions drawn between officers with 
little operational control over subordinates and those with broad authority 
suggest that the standard of CR is commensurate to the commander’s actual 
power to control his or her subordinates. Yamashita provided the basis 
that a failure to prevent or punish violations imposes individual criminal 
responsibility on commanders, even before international tribunals.91 With 
regard to the required elements of CR, liability arises where commanders 
intentionally transmit or give illegal orders. Moreover, commanders can be 
held liable if their failure to ascertain the illegal nature of the orders, or failure 
to sufficiently supervise the conduct of their troops, amounted to criminal 
negligence. High Command suggests that this will be a high threshold.92 The 
principle of strict liability was rejected in all cases. The defence of superior 
orders was also rejected, although it might be a mitigating factor in imposing 
punishment. Thus CR emerged as a doctrine of customary international law.
D. Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions93
In 1977, the first CR doctrine, in the sense of imposing individual criminal 
liability on commanders, was codified in an international agreement.94 
Article 86(1) of AP I provides that states parties “shall repress grave 
breaches, and take measures necessary to suppress all other breaches, 
of the Conventions or of this Protocol which result from failure to act 
88  Ibid. 
89  Ibid.
90  Parks, supra note 1, at 77. 
91  Ibid. at 37. 
92  Parks, supra note 1 at 43.
93  Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions and Relating to the Protection of Victims 
of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, Can. T.S. 1991 
No. 2 (entered into force 7 December 1978) [AP I]. 
94  CR, supra note 50 at 341. 
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when under a duty to do so.”95 Article 86(2) codifies the CR standard, 
stating:96
2. The fact that a breach of the Conventions or of this 
Protocol was committed by a subordinate does not absolve 
his superiors from penal or disciplinary responsibility, as 
the case may be, if they knew, or had information which 
should have enabled them to conclude in the circumstances 
at the time, that he was committing or was going to commit 
such a breach and if they did not take all feasible measures 
with their power to prevent or repress the breach. 
As Green points out, this provision “confirms that a commander is responsible 
if he fails to prevent or repress a breach committed by a subordinate.”97
Articles 87(1) and (3) codify the military commander’s duty to prevent or 
punish breaches of the Geneva Conventions or AP I committed by persons 
under his or her control. It states that:
[Parties] shall require military commanders, with respect 
to members of their armed forces under their command 
and other persons under their control, to prevent, and 
where necessary, to suppress and to report to competent 
authorities breaches of the Conventions and this Protocol. 
[Parties] shall require any commander who is aware that 
subordinates or other persons under his control are going 
to commit or have committed a breach of the Conventions 
or this Protocol, to initiate such steps as are necessary 
to prevent such violations…, and, where appropriate, 
to initiate disciplinary or penal action against violators 
thereof. 
 
95  AP I, supra note 93,art. 86(1). 
96  Ibid, art. 86(2). 
97  CR, supra note 50 at 341. 
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The effect of AP I was to codify a form of CR in conventional international 
law. Superiors are not absolved of responsibility simply because subordinates 
violated the Geneva Conventions or AP I. The duty to prevent and punish 
violations of the treaties is imposed on military commanders who are “aware” 
that those under their control have committed or are about to commit 
violations.98 The mental standard of “aware” remains undefined by AP I.99 
However, article 86(2) provides a “specific and detailed mental standard,” 
namely that the commander “knew, or had information which should have 
enabled them to conclude in the circumstances at the time” that a breach had 
occurred or would occur.100 The latter mental element of “had information” 
is similar to the standard evinced in Hostages. It thus appears to preclude the 
commander being ‘wilfully blind’ or criminally negligent by failing to make 
inquiries when put on notice of possible breaches. 
Two final points should be made regarding AP I. The first is that the treaty 
only applies to “international armed conflict” involving parties to the Geneva 
Conventions and AP I.101 The CR provisions are thus inapplicable in internal 
disturbances. The second point is that AP I does not refer explicitly to civilian 
superiors. While it could be argued that the use of the term “superiors” in 
article 86(2) is broad enough to include civilians, it is ambiguous at best. 
Moreover, the exclusive use of the terms “military commanders” and 
“commanders” in the text and heading of article 87 suggests that it applies 
solely to military commanders. Parks suggests otherwise, asserting that this 
provision includes civilians in the “command and control chain,” such as the 
U.S. President, who is Commander-in-Chief of American armed forces.102 
This is undoubtedly so. However, Parks does not suggest that civilians 
outside the formal chain of command and control structure, without de jure 
legal authority, would be included as “commanders.” As such, AP I provides 
little clarity regarding the problem of civilian CR. 
98  AP I, supra note 93 art. 87(3). 
99  Burnett, supra note 3 at 144. 
100  Burnett, supra note 3 at 144, 145. 
101  AP I, supra note 93 art. 1(3), referring to common art. 2 to the Geneva Conventions; see 
Burnett, supra note 3, at 139. 
102  Parks, “A Few Tools”, supra note 59, at 77. 
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E. The ICTR and ICTY Statutes
No major developments in CR emerged until the establishment of the ICTR 
and ICTY in the 1990s. The ICTR and ICTY statutes contain identical 
codified CR provisions. Thus, only the ICTY need be discussed here. Article 
7(3) and (4) state as follows:103
The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 5 of 
the present Statute was committed by a subordinate does 
not relieve his superior of criminal responsibility if he knew 
or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to 
commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed 
to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent 
such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.
The fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an order 
of a Government or of a superior shall not relieve him of 
criminal responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation 
of punishment if the International Tribunal determines 
that justice so requires.
In a manner resembling High Command, article 7(4) provides that the 
defence of superior orders will not prevent a finding of liability, but may 
be considered to mitigate punishment. Article 7(3) provides the basis for 
CR before the ICTY. Several points can be made about this standard. First, 
the mental standard “is couched in standard legal terminology,” including 
both actual knowledge (“knew”), and constructive knowledge (“had reason 
to know”).104 Second, the provision imposes the duty to prevent or to punish 
perpetrators. Third, the duty will be satisfied by necessary and reasonable 
measures, a “more objective” standard than that in AP I.105 Finally, the term 
“superior” is undefined, thus leaving it open to interpretation as to whether 
CR applies to civilians. The ICTY’s interpretation of this provision will be 
discussed below.
103  ICTY Statute, supra note 17, art. 7(3), (4); ICTR Statute, supra note 18, art. 6(3), (4). 
104  Ann B. Ching, “Evolution of the Command Responsibility Doctrine in Light of the 
Celebici Decision of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia” (1999-
2000) 25 N.C. J. Int’l L. & Comm. Reg. 167, at 184. 
105  Ibid. 
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F. The Rome Statute and its Critics
1. Article 28(b) - CR Applies to Civilians
The Rome Statute creating the world’s first permanent international criminal 
tribunal, the ICC, came into force in 2003.106 In contrast to the ICTY, Article 
28 of the Rome Statute includes a bifurcated CR provision, the heading of 
which distinguishes between “commanders” and “other superiors.”107 Article 
28(b) applies to a superior who is not a “military commander” or “person 
effectively acting as a military commander,”108 thus creating the first codified 
CR doctrine which unambiguously encompasses civilians. Article 28(a) 
recreates the traditional military CR standard, in wording more detailed 
than, but essentially to the same effect as, the ICTY provisions. 
The more novel feature of the Rome Statute is Article 28(b), which provides 
the CR standard for “other superiors”. Article 28(b) states:109 
(b) With respect to superior and subordinate relationships 
not described in paragraph (a), a superior shall be criminally 
responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court 
committed by subordinates under his or her effective 
authority and control, as a result of his or her failure to 
exercise control properly over such subordinates, where:
The superior either knew, or consciously 1. 
disregarded information which clearly indicated, 
that the subordinates were committing or about 
to commit such crimes; 
The crimes concerned activities that were within 2. 
the effective responsibility and control of the 
superior; and 
106  Rome Statute, supra note 7. 
107  Ibid, art. 28. 
108  Ibid, art. 28(a). 
109  Ibid, art. 28(b). 
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The superior failed to take all necessary and 3. 
reasonable measures within his or her power to 
prevent or repress their commission or to submit 
the matter to the competent authorities for 
investigation and prosecution. 
Although the “inaction elements” in articles 28(a)(ii) and 28(b)(iii) are 
substantively identical,110 there are three key differences between the 
military standard in Article 28(a) and the civilian standard in Article 
28(b). First, an obvious difference is that the provision distinguishes 
between commanders and persons effectively acting as such on one hand 
(Article 28(a)(i), and all other superior-subordinate relationships on 
the other (Article 28(b)). Moreover, as Vetter suggests, Article 28(b)(ii), 
which requires that “the crimes concerned activities that were within the 
effective responsibility and control of the superior,” could be interpreted 
as “a modification of the superior-subordinate relationship element.”111 The 
second, related difference is that Article 28(b)(ii) could also be interpreted 
as creating a new element, one requiring “a nexus between the criminal 
activity of the subordinate and the subordinate’s activities that the superior 
can control.”112 This latter interpretation, as noted below, is used by Vetter 
to support his argument that the ICC provision weakens CR from its 
customary state.
The final difference, and the main basis for the criticisms of the ICC civilian 
standard, is that the “knowledge” element in Article 28(b)(i) requires that 
the “superior either knew, or consciously disregarded information which 
clearly indicated” that crimes had been or were about to be committed.113 The 
military standard, by contrast, requires only that the commander “knew, or 
owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known” of the offences.114 
The significance of this difference is that the military standard appears to be 
based on the straight knowledge/criminal negligence standard used in the 
110  Ibid, at 115. 
111  Ibid. 
112  Ibid. 
113  Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 28(b)(ii). 
114  Ibid, art. 28(a)(i) [emphasis added]. 
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post-World War II decisions, whereas the civilian standard requires that the 
superior must have consciously disregarded information clearly indicating 
the commission, actual or potential, of crimes. 
2. Criticisms of Article 28 
The main criticism Vetter levies against the CR provision of the Rome Statute 
is that it “hinders the deterrent power of the doctrine” by lowering the 
standard for civilians vis-à-vis military commanders.115 Vetter summarises 
his essential argument:116 
Historically, the military command responsibility doctrine 
applied not only to military commanders, but also to 
civilians. Thus, one can argue that in bifurcating the 
command responsibility standard based on the type of 
superior-subordinate relationship, the ICC Statute lessens 
the efficacy of the permanent court because the bifurcated 
structure allows a lesser knowledge standard for civilians, 
that is, “consciously disregarded,” and allows the potentially 
new nexus element, that is “crimes concerned activities,” to 
also potentially bar liability for civilians. 
Vetter thus makes two main points. First, he notes that the “consciously 
disregarded” standard may be interpreted by the ICC as imposing a 
CR lower standard on civilian leaders.117 If this concern materialises, 
civilians will be under “a significantly lessened duty… compared to the 
military commander, to remain informed of events within the superior’s 
domain.”118 Superiors will have incentive to remain uninformed, and 
“might systematically fail to acquire such knowledge”119 in order to avoid 
liability. The practical result is that there will be less evidence of the 
superior’s knowledge of wrongdoing, as the superior will ensure that he 
or she is not apprised of such information.120 This would impose a higher 
115  Vetter, supra note 8, at 96. 
116  Ibid, at 116. 
117  Ibid, at 124. 
118  Ibid, at 123. 
119  Ibid, at 124. 
120  Ibid. 
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“evidentiary burden” on the prosecutor “when the defendant is a civilian 
supervisor.”121 
Vetter’s second criticism is of Article 28(b)(ii); the “crimes concerned 
activities” element. As noted above, he suggests that this could either be 
interpreted a modification of the superior-subordinate relationship element 
contained in the main paragraph of Article 28(b), or it could be interpreted 
as requiring a “nexus between the criminal activity of the subordinate and 
the subordinate’s activities that the superior can control.”122 His concern is 
with the latter interpretation. If Article 28(b)(ii) requires a proof of a new 
element, it would “give defence counsel an additional weapon” whereby 
“counsel can vigorously advocate that the prosecutor must prove this new 
element in its entirety.”123
To be fair, Vetter’s criticisms of the CR provision of the Rome Statute are 
based largely on a comparison weighing the civilian standard against its 
companion military provision in the Rome Statute.124 However, Vetter implies 
that Article 28(b) is a regression from CR’s past state under customary 
international law.125 Indeed, he notes particularly that the post-war precedents 
are “persuasive authority” that CR applies to civilians, and that its customary 
form is stronger than that in the Rome Statute.126 The question is, however, 
what actually was the status quo from which the standard was weakened? In 
this respect, Vetter cites the civilian standard against the Celebici decision, on 
the basis that it best reflects the current state of customary law.127 Moreover, 
his argument is also based on the post-war precedents “prior to Celebici.”128 
This argument warrants reviewing the cases which have addressed the 
question of CR and civilians. The following section uses these cases to 
illustrate that Vetter’s argument is problematic. Vetter’s conclusions with 
121  Ibid. 
122  Ibid, at. 115. 
123  Ibid, at 118-119. 
124  Ibid, at 111-112. 
125  Ibid, at 118. 
126  Ibid. 
127  Ibid, at 111-112.
128  Ibid, at 111. 
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respect to the comparison of the bifurcated ICC CR standards are not 
challenged. Rather, it will be shown that precedents holding civilians liable 
on the basis of CR are wildly inconsistent, and worse, unjust. Moreover, 
the ICTY judgment in Kordic calls into question whether, in the absence 
of a codified civilian standard, CR will ever be applied to civilians. As such, 
despite its weaknesses, the ICC civilian CR standard improves on the existing 
state of the law for the mere fact that it explicitly and unambiguously applies 
to civilian superiors. 
IV. INTERNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE  
ON CR AND CIVILIANS
A. Hirota 
At the Tokyo Trial, Cabinet minister Koki Hirota was charged on the basis 
of CR with the mistreatment of prisoners and failure to ensure observance 
of IHL.129 Hirota, a civilian, served as Japan’s Foreign Minister during 
the infamous 1937 Rape of Nanking.130 At the time, Hirota had received 
diplomatic reports of the atrocities, but relied on assurances from the War 
Ministry that the soldiers would be reined in.131 Hirota persisted in relying 
on the assurances, despite the fact these reports continued.132 On the Tokyo 
Trial reasoning described above, 133 Hirota was found to have failed to create 
a system to ensure the proper treatment of prisoners, and was negligent 
in relying on assurances from the War Ministry.134 Holding that he should 
have “insisted before the cabinet” that the atrocities end, the Tribunal 
129  Pritchard & Zaide, supra note 83, “Indictment”, Group Three, Counts 54, 55. 
130  Lippman, supra note 14 at 22. 
131  Ibid. at 22-23. 
132  Vetter, supra note 8 at 125-126.
133  Transcript, supra note 87. 
134  Solis Horwitz, “The Tokyo Trial” (1950) 28 Int’l. Conciliation 473, at 572-573; Vetter, 
supra note 8 at 126. 
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convicted Hirota on these counts and for crimes against peace.135 Hirota was 
executed.136
The CR counts of the Hirota conviction do not accord with the fundamental 
premise that CR arises where there is a legal duty created by the superior’s 
power to actually control subordinates’ conduct. Hirota had no formal 
authority over the Japanese army. At best, he might have had “influence” 
over the military,137 perhaps through his position in Cabinet.138 Indeed, 
Justice Röling would have acquitted Hirota on the basis that the accused 
“certainly could not have prevented…atrocities.”139 Hirota in fact resigned 
from Cabinet in 1938 following a dispute with the military, and Röling’s 
view is thus that Hirota “was not in a position to change what happened.”140
The lack of control indicates that Hirota’s conviction, with regard to the 
CR counts, is deeply problematic. The basis for imposing a legal duty and 
commensurate CR rests on the superior’s ability to actually control the 
conduct of his or her subordinates. In Hirota, however, individual criminal 
liability of the most severe nature was imposed on the flimsy basis of 
“influence”. The imposition of criminal liability for the acts of soldiers over 
which a civilian superior exercises only an indirect influence seems contrary 
to principles of justice. Finding Hirota guilty in the absence of any ability to 
prevent or punish those who violated the laws of war calls into question the 
basis upon which he could justly be held personally responsible. 
The obverse to an overly-strict conception of CR is a dangerous potential 
for injustice. Where superiors are charged with the gravest offences, and 
under threat of severe punishment, on the basis that they failed to prevent 
or punish the acts, it behoves prosecutors and judges to be wary that the 
135  Vetter, ibid, at 126. 
136  Ibid, at 126. 
137  Lippman, supra note 14 at 23. 
138  Vetter, supra note 8 at 126. 
139  Justice B.V.A. Röling, cited in Philip R. Piccigallo, The Japanese on Trial: Allied War 
Crimes Operations in the East, 1945-1951 (Austin, London: University of Texas Press, 
1979) at 30. 
140  B.V.A. Röling & Antonio Cassese, The Tokyo Trial and Beyond (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1993) at 32, 42. 
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desire for punishment does not come at the expense of fairness and justice 
for the accused. Hirota indicates that a codified standard of civilian CR can 
only benefit the international community. The Rome Statute requirement 
that “crimes concerned activities that were within the effective responsibility 
and control of the superior”141 might prevent recurrences of rulings such as 
Hirota. 
B. The Musema Case at the ICTR
Musema is another example of CR gone awry in the absence of a codified 
civilian CR provision. The accused civilian was the manager of a tea factory in 
Rwanda142 who was charged with offences, including genocide, both directly 
and on the basis of CR.143 These charges arose from a series of killings and 
rapes that Musema was alleged to have participated in and failed to prevent 
and punish.144 The trial chamber found Musema guilty on the basis of both 
participation and CR.145 
The most problematic issue with this decision is the Trial Chamber’s finding 
that Musema’s “influential power” over factory workers was sufficient to 
establish liability under CR.”146 This was based on the finding that Musema 
exercised “legal and financial control” over employees, “particularly through 
his power to appoint and remove” employees from their jobs.147 This gave 
him the power to “take reasonable measures to attempt to prevent or punish 
the use of Tea Factory vehicles, uniforms, or other Tea Factory property” 
in the commission of offences. This was sufficient to create “de jure and de 
facto control” over employees.148 As Alexander Zahar points out, this finding 
is extremely problematic:149 
 
141  Rome Statute, supra note 7 art. 28(b)(ii). 
142  Musema, supra note 15 ¶ 10-16.
143  Zahar, supra note 9 at 601. 
144  Musema, supra note 15 at “Summary”, ¶ 32-53. 
145  Ibid. at “Summary”, ¶ 61. 
146  Zahar, supra note 9 at 601. 
147  Musema, supra note 15 ¶ 880. 
148  Ibid. 
149  Zahar, supra note 9 at 602-603. 
Civilian Command Responsibility166 2008
This reasoning is misguided. It does not distinguish 
Musema from any ordinary factory director. Yet it cannot 
be that all business managers stand liable to be convicted 
for international crimes perpetrated by their employees 
for the reason only that they were linked to them through 
commonplace ties of labour. The commander envisaged by 
the Article 6(3) doctrine, in its classical (martial) form, was 
connected to his or her troops not by a mere supervisory 
link; he or she was at the core of a combat unit with powers 
of life and death over defenceless subjects, whether these 
were civilians in a combat zone or prisoners of war; and he 
or she was sworn to abide by the laws of war.
Alfred Musema surely committed horrendous crimes. However, the Trial 
Chamber’s application of CR to a tea factory manager is absurd. The ability 
to dock pay or fire someone is in no way analogous to a commander’s power 
to dispense military justice. Musema highlights the fact that in the absence 
of an express civilian CR standard, inconsistent and problematic decisions 
can result. 
C. ICTY Cases – Celebici and Kordic 
1. Celebici
The leading authority on the required elements of CR is Celebici. Celebici 
provides the first decision of an international tribunal since WWII to address 
the issue of CR. It thoroughly reviews its application to civilians. As such, it 
is the “contemporary authority” on CR.150 Celebici is often cited as authority 
that CR can be applied to civilians. 
Celebici involved charges against four Bosnian men charged with murder, 
torture, and other offences committed while they worked as guards and 
commanders of a prison camp in the village of Celebici.151 Three of the 
accused were charged on the basis of CR.152 Delic was deputy commander 
150  Ibid, at 592. 
151  Celebici, supra note 10 ¶, 2, 3. 
152  Ibid. ¶ 21. 
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of the prison, without formal legal authority. Mucic also acted as de facto 
commander. Delalic was a military commander with responsibility for 
the prison-camp.153 All were charged with failing to prevent or punish the 
mistreatment of prisoners.154 
Celebici is most useful for its rendering of the essential elements of CR under 
the ICTY Statute. Celebici held that CR required proof of three elements:155 
the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship;1. 
the superior knew or had reason to know that the 2. 
criminal act was about to be or had been committed; 
and
the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable 3. 
measures to prevent the criminal act or punish the 
perpetrator thereof.
It is in respect to the superior-subordinate element that the question of 
civilians arose in Celebici. 
The Trial Chamber relied on post-war precedents such as Hirota to hold that 
civilians could satisfy the superior-subordinate element.156 Formal command 
was unnecessary; de facto command could satisfy the superior element.157 
However, Celebici is extremely cautious in demarking when civilians would 
satisfy this element. While noting that in cases like Hirota, CR had been 
imposed on civilians on the basis of “powers of persuasion rather than formal 
legal authority to order action to be taken,” the Trial Chamber cautioned 
that “the fundamental considerations underlying the basis of [CR] must be 
kept in mind.”158 In this regard the ICTY stated:159
153  Zahar, supra note 9 at 604. 
154  Ibid. at 604-605. 
155  Celebici, supra note 10 ¶ 346. 
156  Ibid. ¶ 357-358 363. 
157  Ibid. ¶ 370. 
158  Ibid. ¶ 376-377. 
159  Ibid. ¶ 377. 
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[CR] is ultimately predicated upon the power of the 
superior to exercise this power so as to prevent and 
repress the crimes committed by his subordinates, and 
a failure by him to do in a diligent manner is sanctioned 
by the imposition of individual criminal responsibility 
in accordance with the doctrine. It follows that there is a 
threshold at which persons cease to possess the necessary 
powers of control over the actual perpetrators of offences 
and, accordingly, cannot properly be considered “superiors” 
within the meaning of Article 7(3) of the Statute. While the 
Trial Chamber must at all times be alive to the realities of 
any given situation and be prepared to pierce such veils of 
formalism that may shield those individuals carrying the 
greatest responsibility for heinous acts, great care must be 
taken lest an injustice be committed in holding individuals 
responsible for the acts of others in situations where the 
link of control is absent or too remote. 
Celebici accordingly required “effective control over the person committing 
the underlying violations,” defined as the “material ability to prevent and 
punish the commission of these offences.”160 The control exercised must 
be to a degree analogous to that of military commanders.161 The ICTY was 
obviously concerned about the injustice which can arise if CR is too loosely 
applied, and Celebici certainly casts doubt on the correctness of Hirota. 
In the result, only Mucic was convicted on the basis of CR.162 The ICTY did 
not go so far as to refer to Mucic as a “civilian,” but they did note that he was 
not formally appointed as a commander, having only de facto authority.163 
This result might suggest that Celebici imposed CR on a civilian, in the sense 
that Mucic had no de jure authority over the prison camp. Such a conclusion, 
however, is not entirely evident. Mucic was certainly “less of a civilian than 
a tea-factory director.”164 Indeed, the willingness to find that Mucic had de 
160  Ibid. ¶ 378. 
161  Ibid.
162  Ibid. ¶ 775, 1237. 
163  Ibid. ¶ 733, 775, 1237.
164  Zahar, supra note 9 at 606. 
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facto authority was partly based on the fact that the complex Yugoslavia 
situation was such that “control and command structures” were “ambiguous 
and ill-defined.”165 Thus, the ICTY may not have considered Mucic a civilian 
at all, but rather an informal military commander in a new, improvised, and 
dynamic control and command structure. 
2. Kordic
Kordic concerned the prosecution of a Bosnian Croat civilian political leader 
charged with offences arising from fighting between Bosnian Croats and 
Muslims in central Bosnia.166 The indictment charged Kordic on the bases 
including CR.167 The facts and holding of this decision are most clearly stated 
in the ICTY’s acquittal on the CR charges:168
Dario Kordic was a civilian and a politician with tremendous 
influence and power in Central Bosnia. He occupied an 
important position in the leadership of the HZ H-B, but was 
not in the top echelon, being answerable to Mate Boban. 
While he played an important role in military matters, even 
at times issuing orders, and exercising authority over HVO 
forces, he was, and remained throughout the Indictment 
period, a civilian, who was not part of the formal command 
structure of the HVO. 
These findings indicate that Kordic was a perfect case to apply the Celebici 
standard to find a civilian liable on the basis of CR. Kordic had great influence 
and power, and played an important role in military matters. Indeed, he 
ordered attacks which were carried out. While not in formal command of 
the Bosnian Croat forces, he certainly exercised de facto control akin to that 
of a military commander. Simply put, he could have prevented or punished 
international crimes.
165  Celebici, supra note 10 at 354. 
166  Kordic, supra note 13 ¶ 1. 
167  Ibid. ¶ 5(f). 
168  Ibid. ¶ 838-839. 
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Nevertheless, Kordic was acquitted on the CR charges. Other than citing the 
caution in Celebici, the decision gives little indication as to why Kordic did 
not exercise de facto command. As the decision states:169
Although liability under Article 7(3) may attach to 
civilians as well as military personnel, once it is established 
that the requisite power to prevent or punish exists, the 
Chamber holds that great care must be taken in assessing 
the evidence to determine command responsibility in 
respect of civilians, lest an injustice is done. In the first 
place, it is established that substantial influence (such as 
Kordic had), by itself, is not indicative of a sufficient degree 
of control for liability under Article 7(3). Secondly, while 
liability under Article 7(3) may attach not only to persons 
in formal positions of command, but also to those who 
are effectively in command of more informal structures, 
the Chamber finds that Kordic lacked effective control, 
which the Appeals Chamber in the Celebici case defined as 
“a material ability to prevent or punish criminal conduct, 
however that control is exercised”.
In sum, the Chamber finds that Kordic was neither a 
commander nor a superior in respect of the HVO, since he 
possessed neither the authority to prevent the crimes that 
were committed, nor to punish the perpetrators of those 
crimes, and as such, he is not liable under Article 7(3) of 
the Statute. 
These reasons are difficult to reconcile with the holding. The Trial Chamber 
finds that Kordic exercised authority over the military and ordered the 
commission of illegal acts, which were indeed carried out. And yet it 
somehow concludes that Kordic lacked the ability to prevent the crimes. 
Such reasoning strains credulity. It is difficult to imagine how someone who 
orders the commission of a crime, knowing it will be carried out at their 
behest, cannot also prevent that crime. Of course, the Trial Chamber could 
169  Ibid. ¶ 840-841. 
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afford to neglect the CR charges, as they had already convicted Kordic for 
direct liability. Nevertheless the Kordic decision obviously calls into question 
whether a civilian would ever be held liable on the Celebici standard, tenuous 
cases such as Musema notwithstanding. 
V. CONCLUSION
The debate over the application of CR to civilian superiors stems from a 
more fundamental tension, one common in the context of criminal justice in 
Western democracies: balancing fairness and justice to the alleged offender 
against the need to prevent and punish the most deplorable international 
crimes. This paper has indicated that CR is one of relatively few means by 
which the international community can hold civilian leaders individually 
responsible for breaches of IHL. On this view, it is more unjust to allow 
civilian leaders to dodge responsibility by exploiting a de jure, formalistic 
distinction between military and civilian authority. This view certainly has 
merit. As Vetter’s lucid critique indicates, the Rome Statute’s bifurcated CR 
provision imposes lower responsibility for civilian superiors vis-à-vis military 
commanders. From the perspective of the efficacy of prosecuting breaches 
of international humanitarian law, this lower standard is problematic. It is 
particularly so because the critique implicitly holds that CR has always been 
applied to civilians in the past without issue or ill effects. 
This paper, however, has shown that the application of CR to civilians is not 
at all settled. Cases like Hirota and Musema illustrate the potential injustice 
which can arise when CR, in the absence of a settled standard, is applied in an 
unprincipled manner. The underlying justification for punishing superiors 
for offences committed by subordinates is that the superior has both a duty 
and the power to prevent such conduct. Where the superior fails to do so, 
either intentionally or through criminal negligence, punishment becomes 
both morally and legally justifiable. It is very likely the haphazard manner in 
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which CR was applied in cases such as Hirota contributed to the development 
of the cautious Celebici view – so starkly exemplified by Kordic – that CR 
must be tightly controlled. International jurists are reticent to extend CR too 
far, especially when tasked with applying a traditionally military doctrine to 
civilians on the basis of unclear, inconsistent and sparse historical precedent, 
and in the absence of a codified, clear civilian standard. 
In this respect, Article 28 of the Rome Statute is not a stumble backwards 
from past customary international law on CR, but a strong step forward. 
While its civilian CR standard may not be as strict as some might have hoped 
for, the Rome Statute nevertheless codifies a solid starting block for applying 
CR to civilian superiors with consistency, principle, and justice. 
